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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE LENGTH 
OF THE PARTIES' TWO MARRIAGES WAS AN EXTENUATING 
FACTOR FOR AN AWARD OF ALIMONY LONGER THAN FIVE 
YEARS WAS AN ERROR IN LAW AND THEREFORE AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION 
In Kellev v. Kelly. 2000 UT App. 236, 9P.3d 171, |28 (hereinafter "Kelley I") the 
Court of Appeals remanded and specifically and unequivocally instructed the trial court to 
limit the duration of the alimony award to the length of the common law marriage to wit: 
five years unless the trial court made "further findings addressing whether extenuating 
circumstances exist as to satisfy section 30-3-5(7)(h), Rehn, 1999 UT App 041 at ^ 14." 
Id. In Wayne's Brief of Appellant, (hereinafter "Kelley IF) Wayne asserted that the trial 
court erred as a matter of law by finding extenuating circumstances to exist upon which to 
award alimony for a length of time in excess of the five year common law marriage based 
merely upon the total length of the parties' two marriages. Wayne asserted that the trial 
court erred as a matter of law because the Court of Appeals in Kellev I limited the 
duration of alimony to five years absent "further findings" of extenuating circumstances 
and its failure to make "further findings" as required by the appeals court was an error in 
law. In her responsive brief, Sonia argues that the standard of review, correction of legal 
error, asserted by Wayne is incorrect and that an abuse of discretion standard must be 
applied. Soma's argument incorrectly construes the status of this case and seeks to 
impose the issues presented to and decided by the appeals court in Kellev I. Sonia seeks 
to require Wayne to once again establish that the trial court abused its discretion in 
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awarding alimony for a longer period than the common law marriage even though Wayne 
previously established abuse of discretion and the matter was remanded for further 
findings as to extenuating circumstances. The trial court's failure to follow the law as 
established in Kellev I was error and the appeals court should grant no deference to the 
trial court's conclusion. 
Rulings of a trial court based upon a flawed legal conclusion are an abuse of 
discretion. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, 38 P.3d 307, Tf21 (analyzing the standard 
of review in context of a Rule 60(b) motion). In the present matter, the trial court was 
instructed by the Court of Appeals to limit the duration of the alimony to five years, 
absent specific findings of extenuating circumstances. The trial court's legal conclusion 
is flawed because its findings of fact from remand are essentially the same as the findings 
of fact from the first trial, with the exception that the trial court simply added the words 
"extenuating circumstances" (R. pp. 1845-46.) (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on Remand from the Court of Appeals, attached hereto as Exhibit B.) Specifically, 
the Court of Appeals stated that the trial court's findings were "inadequate to support an 
alimony award for a period of sixteen years" Kellev, 2000 UT App 236 at ^28 and it 
remanded ". . . for the entry of further findings addressing whether extenuating 
circumstances exist" IcL The trial court's failure to make and enter further findings 
addressing whether extenuating circumstances exist that justify an award of alimony for a 
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period longer than the length of the parties' marriage was an error in law and as such, 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Furthermore, a trial court's failure to properly analyze the parties' circumstances in 
regard to the standards of law is an abuse of discretion. Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing the standard of review in the context of an 
award of alimony). On remand, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly 
analyze the facts of the case and apply them to the standards of law as directed by the 
Court of Appeals. Wayne argued in his appellate brief and reiterates herein that the trial 
court's error in law by failing to follow the specific instructions of the appellate court is 
an abuse of its discretion. 
IL WAYNE IS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
FROM BELOW BECAUSE THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT 
DISPUTED 
Sonia argues that Wayne failed to marshal the evidence from below to support his 
argument that the trial court abused its discretion when awarding alimony for a period 
longer than five years and thus, Wayne's appeal should be denied. However, Wayne is 
not required to marshal the evidence because the findings of fact made by the trial court 
are undisputed and are basically the same findings of fact that were reviewed in Kellev I. 
When asserting that findings of fact made by the trial court are clearly erroneous or 
unsupported by the evidence, the appellant is required to marshal the evidence from 
below to support the findings of fact. Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App. 12, f7, 973 P.2d 
431. In this case, Wayne does not dispute that the evidence presented below supports the 
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findings of fact made by the trial court, i.e., that the parties had two marriages that, when 
combined, totaled approximately 18 years, that Sonia has need for alimony, and that 
Wayne has the ability to pay. The issue before the Court herein is that the findings of fact 
made by the trial court on remand do not support a conclusion of law that extenuating 
circumstances exist so as to justify an award of alimony for a period longer than the 
length of the common law marriage. Because Wayne is not asserting that the findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the evidence, it is not incumbent upon 
Wayne to marshal the facts to support those findings. Soma's argument to the contrary is 
misplaced and should be rejected. 
III. THE TOTAL TIME OF THE PARTIES' TWO MARRIAGES IS NOT 
AN EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE UPON WHICH TO BASE 
ALIMONY FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN THE LENGTH OF 
THE MARRIAGE 
Sonia argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the total 
time of the parties' two marriages in awarding alimony for a period of time longer than 
the common law marriage. In support of her argument, Sonia incorrectly relies on a 
statement in Kellev L quoting Whvte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793-94 (Utah 1994) where 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the actual duration of the relationship predating the 
order establishing the common law marriage is recognized. Kellev, 2000 UT App. 236 at 
T}28. The language that Sonia relies upon does not support her argument that the length of 
the parties' two marriages can be considered an extenuating circumstance so as to justify 
an award of alimony longer than the period of the common law marriage. The Kellev I 
court relied on the Whvte language to indicate that Soma's and Wayne's common law 
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marriage actually predates the date of the order establishing the marriage, not that both 
marriages can be counted for alimony purposes. The conclusion of the court in Kellev I 
directly follows the language quoted by Sonia in her brief and clarifies the court's 
purpose in citing Whvte. 
In Whvte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994), the supreme court held that 
when a non-solemnized marriage is established under section 30-1-4.5, the 
actual duration of the relationship, predating such establishment, is 
recognized. See id. at 793-94. Hence, upon entry of the order 
establishing the marriage here, Wayne and Sonia were remarried on 
July 18, 1994, thereby terminating her entitlement to alimony under 
the first decree. 
Kellev, 2000 UT App. 236 at f 28 (emphasis added.) 
In this matter it is undisputed that Wayne and Sonia entered into a common law 
marriage as of the date of their first divorce and the length of the parties' common law 
marriage was five years. Kellev, 2000 UT App. 236 at ^28. It is also undisputed that the 
trial court based the award of alimony upon the length of the parties' two marriages, 
Soma's need for alimony, and Wayne's ability to pay. The total length of the parties' two 
marriages does not rise to the level of an extenuating circumstance. The findings must 
still evaluate the factors contained in the record that would support a conclusion that 
extenuating circumstances exist. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). Sonia and Wayne are not unusual in having been married to each other more than 
once, and it is not unusual for parties who divorce and change their mind to live in a 
common law marriage before deciding to legitimate their reconsideration. See Clark v. 
Clark, 2001 UT App. 44, 27 P.3d 538 (parties lived together in a common law marriage 
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subsequent to an 18 year solemnized marriage). The statutory presumption for an award 
of alimony is that alimony will be awarded for the length of the marriage rather than the 
relationship. See U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(h). Section 30-3-5(7)(h) allows a trial court to make 
a finding of extenuating circumstances to warrant alimony for a period longer than the 
length of the marriage. Id. Holding that remarriage to the same partner to establish a 
long-term award of alimony constitutes an extenuating circumstance is contrary to the 
statutory presumption against such awards. See Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that awarding non-terminable alimony in order to allow the wife 
to maintain a standard of living violated the statutory presumption against such an award 
because standard of living must be considered in every alimony award). The trial court's 
conclusion of law that the length of the parties' two marriages was an extenuating 
circumstance sufficient to justify an award of alimony for longer than the statutory 
requirement of the length of the marriage is erroneous and should be reversed. 
Additionally, if Soma's argument that the trial court can consider the total length 
of the parties' two marriages as an extenuating circumstance justifying an order of 
alimony for a period longer than the second marriage was correct, it makes the remand 
from the Court of Appeals merely an exercise rather than an actual remand with 
instructions. The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court to limit alimony to a 
period of five years or for "entry of further findings addressing whether extenuating 
circumstances exist as to satisfy section 30-3-5(7)OiV' Kelley, 2000 UT App 236 at f 28. 
Instead of limiting alimony to five years or making further findings, the trial court on 
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remand simply added the words "extenuating circumstances" to its previous findings of 
fact and ordered alimony to continue for 16 years. The Court of Appeals in Kelley I 
could have affirmed the initial award of alimony based upon the length of the two 
marriages. See DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (Appellate court can 
affirm on any ground) However, Kelley I did not affirm and clearly remanded for a 
limitation on the time frame or for further findings setting forth extenuating 
circumstances to justify an award of alimony for a length of time longer than the common 
law marriage. The Court of Appeals already understood that the trial court found that 
there was a long-term marriage. Had this been enough, there would have been no need to 
remand for further findings on extenuating circumstances. The trial court's further 
findings do not support a conclusion of extenuating circumstances and thus, the remand 
trial court abused its discretion. The trial court's award of alimony for 16 years was 
erroneous and such award should be reversed and limited to five years total. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's determination that the total length of time of the parties' two 
marriages was an extenuating circumstance to award alimony for a period of time longer 
than the parties' second marriage was an error in law and thus an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court's findings of length of marriage, needs of the recipient, and the 
obligor's ability to pay fail to rise to the level of extenuating circumstances to justify an 
alimony award of longer than the length of the marriage. 
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TJie trial court's award of alimony for 16 years should be reversed and the award 
of alimony should be limited to a total of five years. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2j{_ day of July, 2003 
'& RICHMAN, LlL.C. 
JARTJJOHNSEN 
Srneys for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—000OOO000— 
SONIAKELLEY, 
Petitioner, FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
v. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
WAYNE KELLEY, : Civil No. 944700827DA 
Respondent. : Judge Rodney S. Page 
—000OOO000— 
The above-entitled consolidated matters came on regularly for trial on the 3rd and 
4th days of December, 1998, petitioner appearing in person and by her attorneys, B. L. Dart 
and Mark A. Larsen, respondent appearing in person and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock 
and the Court having heard testimony from witnesses and having received various 
documentary evidence and the matter having been argued and submitted and the Court 
being fully advised, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties were married to each other on the 24th day 
of May 1980, in Ft. Worth, Texas. 
2. During this marriage the parties had two children born as issue of this 
marriage, to wit: Christopher W. Kelley, currently 14 years of age, born February 5, 1985 
and Erin Renee Kelley, currently eight years of age, born September 9, 1990. 
3. Over the course of the marriage respondent worked primarily in construction. 
He founded and was the owner of Altex Construction in Alaska involved in work on the 
DEW line and other government contracts. 
4. In 1990 DSI was created. Respondent owns 55% of DSPs-stock. DSI was 
involved in the construction of government facilities and modification of government 
facilities to insulate those facilities from terrorism. This work was worldwide. 
5. During the marriage between the parties respondent's work was such that it 
required him to be away from home for extended periods which included on occasion 
renting apartments in which to stay. This occurred on one occasion in Colorado and on 
one occasion in Texas. Because of the nature of his work, he was home intermittently, 
was gone for long periods of time on a regular basis and was very seldom at home on a 
long-term, continuous basis. 
6. In 1993 and 1994 DSI became involved with the Mathews Companies, 
corporations which were in difficulty at that time. DSI sought to take over Mathews to 
shore it up so that Mathews would be able to perform under various contracts on which DSI 
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had contingent liability and also to improve DSI's financial situation. These were the facts 
as of Spring of 1994. 
7. The parties were not unfamiliar with the vicissitudes of the construction 
business. They experienced a bankruptcy while they were in Texas. They had given a 
deed in lieu of foreclosure on the residence in which they had lived in the State of 
Washington. 
8. The transactions between DSI and Mathews Companies required that 
respondent individually indemnify Mathews Companies by signing bonds for Mathews 
Companies' performance which would expose his assets to considerable risk. 
9. In discussions between the parties, respondent told petitioner about this 
problem and the need to preserve and protect the family home. He proposed that the 
parties should enter into a divorce so that the home could be placed in petitioner's name 
to protect it from potential of creditors because of the concerns he had related to the 
DSI/Mathews Companies transaction. He represented to the petitioner that the parties 
were not going to be separated and that nothing would change from how they had lived 
before. 
10. During the spring and summer of 1994, the parties agreed to and did enter 
into a divorce action, resulting in a divorce being entered on the 18th day of July, 1994, in 
the District Court of Davis County, Civil No. 944700827DA. The Court finds that the 
agreement between the parties to divorce was an agreement for a non-traditional divorce 
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which created a legal fiction only, designed to protect the residence of the parties from the 
threat of creditors. 
11. In connection with the divorce action petitioner contacted an attorney. 
Respondent waived his rights. Both of the parties attended a parenting class and the Court 
accepts the testimony of Dr. Marty Hood and finds it is credible that during the intermission 
halfway through the parenting class, respondent approached her and told her that the 
divorce the parties were going through was only a business thing and that the children 
would never know there was even going to be a divorce and that there was no real need 
for them to continue to attend the class on how to deal with the children in a divorce 
situation. He further told her that there was not going to be a separation. The result of 
respondent's statements was that Ms. Hood signed a Certificate of Completion allowing 
the parties to leave before the class was completed. 
12. Under the Decree of Divorce petitioner was awarded the custody of the minor 
children of the parties subject to respondent's rights of visitation. The petitioner was 
awarded the house and furnishings. Respondent was awarded his stock in DSI and the 
parties7 investment in property in Kodiak, Alaska. It was further provided that respondent 
would be responsible for the payment of all debts up to June 1994. 
13. Respondent was to pay child support of $1,000 a month for the two minor 
children of the parties and alimony of $1,000 a month to the petitioner. He was further 
ordered to maintain health insurance for the children and life insurance on himself for the 
benefit of the children. The divorce was granted to the petitioner on her Complaint. 
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14. At that time, the Court finds DSI was a viable, but closely held, corporation 
which listed considerable assets, including the balance sheet of March 31, 1994, 
introduced as Exhibit No. 3, reflecting a book value of $1,134,828.09. The Court further 
finds, however, the value is found by a number of factors and book value is only one of 
those factors. Because DSI is a closely-held corporation, and its primary assets were 
accounts receivable and similar assets, this brings into question its true value. There is no 
question that the respondent's interest in DSI had some value and that respondent's 
interest in the Kodiak property also had some value. The Kodiak property was generating 
$10,000 per month in income and, at that time, it was expected to produce for a period into 
the future. 
15. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, the mortgage 
payment on the home awarded to the petitioner was $2,400 a month, which was $400 
more than the combined support and alimony award to the petitioner. This was at a time 
when petitioner had not worked outside of the home for a considerable period of time and 
was not employed earning any income, although she graduated from college. 
16. Prior to the divorce the standard of living of the parties was one in which 
respondent would give to petitioner $7,500 a month to pay bills. This arrangement had 
existed for some substantial period of time. Also, at the time of the divorce respondent was 
receiving a draw through his employment with DSI in the amount of $8,000 a month and 
was further receiving a distribution on the Kodiak property of $10,000 a month, a combined 
amount of $18,000 a month. 
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17. Following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, there was no 
change in the relationship of the parties and in their living arrangements. The parties 
continued to live the same as they had prior to the divorce. Titles to marital residence was 
not transferred until after this action was filed. The title to the Kodiak property was never 
transferred. The parties continued to maintain a joint checking account. The parties filed 
a joint 1994 income tax return, reflecting that they were husband and wife as of the end of 
1994. The parties continued to cohabit with sexual relations. The children, who at that 
time were nine and three and one-half years of age, were never told about any changes 
in their parents' relationship. 
18. In July, 1994, the parties appeared at a counseling class and told the 
counselor that this divorce was only for business purposes and that the children would 
never know that the parties were divorced. The parties continued to socialize together; 
they attended a Christmas party together in December 1994, each held the other out as 
a married couple. No one in the community was told of the divorce at that time. During 
this time, respondent maintained an apartment in Texas. 
19. Respondent represented that he was concerned about his business dealings 
and the possibility of telephone surveillance, telling the petitioner that he could not talk with 
heron the phone. 
20. In May 1995, respondent sent petitioner an anniversary card in which he 
indicated he loved her and a wish for another 15 years. See Exhibit No. 6. 
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21. In the summer of 1995, as part of a family vacation, the parties traveled to 
Mexico,, shared a room and had sexual relations. 
22. In October 1995, respondent faxed a letter to petitioner expressing his love 
and looking forward to being with petitioner at Christmas so that things could again be the 
way they had been. See Exhibit No. 8. 
23. In the fall of 1995, petitioner became suspicious that there was another 
woman. Respondent told petitioner that his relationship with the other woman was only a 
fling and that it was over. The parties' relationship was reestablished and everything 
continued as it had in the past during their marriage, including their sexual relationship. 
24. During the entire period from the entry of the Decree of Divorce the financial 
relationship remained the same and respondent provided petitioner with funds at the same 
standard of living which had existed prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
25. In the spring of 1996, petitioner found out that respondent's relationship with 
the other woman had not terminated. In May 1996, there was an altercation which was 
primarily precipitated by a visitation dispute, resulting in the police being called and the 
filing of criminal charges against respondent. Following this altercation, respondent cut 
petitioner off from funds as they had previously been provided. Because of this action, 
petitioner sought legal counsel and subsequently filed actions including a Petition to Modify 
and pleadings setting forth theories of a common law marriage and fraud. 
26. The Court finds that there was no fraud or misrepresentation in connection 
with the divorce in 1994. Petitioner was college educated, and the Court finds that her 
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claimed reliance on the representations of respondent was not justifiable. Given the 
circumstances at that time, however, neither party expected the property aspects of the 
divorce to be valid nor implemented. 
27. The Court finds that as of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on July 18, 
1994, petitioner knew that they would have to remarry. As of that day, the parties were 
unmarried. They continued their marital relationship, they continued to cohabit, they 
continued to treat each other as married, they had joint checking accounts, and respondent 
maintained all of his personal property at the marital residence. The parties filed joint 
income tax returns for the 1994 year. Respondent sent petitioner money from which she 
serviced joint debts. The parties maintained joint credit cards. The parties held 
themselves out as married in the area of their domicile in Davis County, and in that area 
of the domicile had the reputation of being married. They held themselves out to their 
children as married. The parties continued to cohabit and hold each other out as spouse 
through April of 1996. The parties had a reputation in the community for being married and 
all of these actions arise out of a contract between two consenting parties. 
28. The Court has heard much testimony regarding DSI's value. It is difficult to 
set the value of DSI. The Court finds that the critical day of valuation is the day of the 
Court's ruling. As of this time DSI is bereft of value except for receivables and a lien on 
the Bear Hollow house, which are of questionable value. In 1997 DSI did receive a 
substantial settlement in litigation in which it was involved in the amount of $1,900,000, 
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relief of debt and an agreement to hold DSI harmless. The net payment to DSI was 
$1,300,000 after the deduction of attorneys' fees and costs. 
29. The money from DSPs net settlement was used primarily for the purchase of 
a Mercedes 600SL and the construction of a large residence in Summit County, known as 
the Bear Hollow property. These expenditures were primarily for the benefit of respondent. 
The settlement funds were not used to retire DSPs substantial outstanding debt. 
30. With regard to the Kodiak property, its value is now negative, and the Court 
is unaware of its value, if any, now. 
31. Respondent has an interest in Omega-Oil. Fr :>iTt the testimoi i) ' it: is not clear 
whether this interest is a 10% interest in stock or an option to acquire 10% of the stock . 
Respondent is the president of Omega Oil and from Omega Oil receives a monthly income 
of $6,000 since June of 1996. Based upon the evidence before the Court, the Court is 
unable to set a value on respondent's interest in Omega Oil. 
32. Respondent is the title owner of property in Summit County known as the 
Bear Hollow property located at 2525 Bear Hollow Drive, Park City, Utah, which is more 
particularly described as: 
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to the 
official plat thereof, recorded in the official records of 
the Summit County Recorder. 
The value of this property is in question. There has been testimony of from $2,000,000 to 
$1,500,000. Against this property there is a primary trust deed obligation of $500,000 and 
a second trust deed obligation of $250,000. In addition, there is a $958,000 mechanic's 
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lien which has been filed by DSI and which currently is in litigation. The parties' equity 
interest in the Bear Hollow house, therefore, currently is in litigation in Summit County, 
Utah. 
33. The Court finds the home at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah, 
has a value of $345,000, subject to a first mortgage obligation of $236,000 and an 
attorney's lien from Louise Knauer, petitioner's prior attorney, of $10,000, resulting in a 
remaining equity of $109,000. 
34. The Court finds that respondent has manipulated his corporations by taking 
funds through loans and not as income with these withdrawals as he sees fit. This is not 
a traditional method of compensation, and respondent has manipulated his income as he 
has seen fit. 
35. The Court finds that respondent has used the assets of these businesses to 
meet his own living expenses and to purchase property for his own interest. The Mercedes 
600SL is an example. 
36. The Court finds that historically respondent has had an income in excess of 
$10,000 a month with funds received from the Kodiak property and a salary of $8,000 from 
DSI. Currently respondent receives a salary of $6,000 a month from Omega Oil. In 
addition, respondent has received funds through loans not reflected as income from his 
various businesses. Consistent with his past manipulations, respondent currently has 
manipulated his income to limit his income presented in this proceeding. 
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37. The Court finds that the income amounts reflected above coincide with the 
amount of funds utilized by the parties to meet ongoing family expenses, both prior to the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, and since that time. 
38. The Court finds that respondent currently has the ability to produce income 
at the amoi n it of $10,000 a month and finds that his income is in this amount. 
39. Petitioner has sought and obtained employment and currently has the ability 
to earn an income on an hourly rate of $8.71 per hnur in the gross amount of $1,498 a 
month on a full-time basis. This amount would be subject to taxes. She is capable of 
working full time, but is working on a part-time basis by c! loice. • 
40. The gross income of the parties exceeds the child support guideline. 
41. The Court finds that each of the parties have incurred attorneys' fees in this 
action. The Court further finds that there has been certain obstreperous conduct on the 
part of respondent with respect to discovery, making it difficult to process and prosecute 
this action. The Court further finds that respondent has a substantial ability to earn an 
income. 
42. As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by Louise Knauer, the 
Court heard testimony from Louise Knauer and finds that those fees were necessarily 
incurred. The work performed was reasonable and necessary for the prosecution of this 
action. The Court further finds that petitioner has no funds with which to pay these fees. 
The attorney's fees petitioner incurred for the services of Louise Knauer in the amount of 
$10,951 were reasonably and necessarily incurred. 
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43. As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by B. L. Dart and Mark 
A. Larsen, the Court finds that substantial work was performed, that a large amount of this 
work was necessary to prosecute this case to a conclusion through trial. The Court further 
finds that petitioner has no funds with which to pay these fees. The request for attorney's 
fees of Dart and Larsen is the amount of $46,574.95, as reflected in Exhibit Nos. 15 & 16. 
The Court finds that this is excessive, that these are two well-qualified lawyers, either of 
whom could have individually tried the case without the need of the other. Under all the 
facts and circumstances of this case the Court finds that the reasonable amount for the 
attorneys' fees incurred by these attorneys for their reasonable and necessary services is 
the sum of $25,000 forwhich respondent should be responsible to petitioner. 
Based upon the preceding findings of fact, the Court enters the following 
conclusions of law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner has failed to show fraud by clear and convincing evidence. 
2. There was a common law marriage entered into by the parties by reason of 
their ongoing relationship. This common law marriage commenced immediately following 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce on the 18th day of July, 1994, and will terminate at such 
time as the Decree of Divorce enters in this case. 
3. The parties have now been separated since June 1996, the differences 
between them are irreconcilable and petitioner is entitled to a divorce from respondent on 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
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4. In June of 1996, respondent elected to terminate the parties ongoing 
relationship and his financial support of petitioner. These actions constituted a substantial 
change of circumstances. 
5. Based upon the change of circumstances which the Court has found and, 
further, based upoi i the common law marriage of the parties, the Court hereby modifies the 
terms of the former settlement to provide for the following award: 
a. Petitioner is awarded the equity of the parties in the home and real property 
at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah, subject to petitioner 
assuming its outstanding indebtedness. 
b. Petitioner is awarded all furniture and fixtures located therein. 
e. Petitioner is awarded one-third of respondent's equity in the Bear Hollow 
property, and respondent is awarded two-thirds of his equity in the Bear 
Hollow pr operty, subject to outstanding liei is against it. The property is more 
particularly described as: 
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to the 
official plat thereof, recorded in the official records of 
the Summit County Recorder. 
Respondent is ordered to pay all taxes, utilities, debt and Trust Deed Notes 
on the Bear Hollow house. The parties at their mutual expense are to retain 
an independent appraiser to establish an appraisal value for the Bear Hollow 
property. The property is currently listed for sale and should continue to be 
listed for sale over a multiple board listing under terms that the property is to 
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be sold for any cash offer for 90% or more of the appraised value. Each 
party shall be apprised of any offers and have the right of open 
communication with the listing realtor. If any other offers are received which 
one party desires to accept and the other party does not desire to accept, 
then the party desiring to accept the offer shall have the right to come before 
the Court to request that the property be sold for this offer and the Court will 
then make a determination of whether this sale is to occur on these terms. 
d. Respondent is awarded his interest in the property in Kodiak, Alaska, subject 
to any outstanding obligations owing thereon. This property is more particularly described 
as follows: 
That portion of Lot two (2), Block ten (10), New Kodiak 
Subdivision, according to Plat 72-2, located in this 
Kodiak Recording District, Third Judicial District, State 
of Alaska, which lies within the following described 
property: 
That portion of United States Survey Number 559, 
located in the Kodiak Recording District, Third 
Judicial District, State of Alaska, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at Corner No. 1 of United States Survey 
Number 1797, as shown on the Plat of Kodiak 
Townsite, United States Survey Number 2537B, as 
accepted by the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office, September 11, 1941, said point being an 
unnumbered corner of United States Survey Number 
559, the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING of this 
description; 
Thence N 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 56.58 feet; 
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Thence N 45 degrees 50' E, a distance of 138.09 feet; 
Thence S 44 degrees 10' E, a distance of 131.38 feet; 
Thence S 45 degrees 50' W, a distance of 138.00 feet, 
more or less, to a point of intersection with a line drawn 
S 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 78.06 feet, more or 
less, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
e. Respondent is awarded his stock or option interests in Omega Oil. 
f. Respondent is awarded any property currently in his possession, including 
furniture and furnishings and any interest, if any, in the Mercedes 600SL. 
g. Respondent is awarded certain personal property and to the extent it is in the 
possession of petitioner and with reference to Exhibit P34, these items are 
as follows: 
(1) The floor standing globe. 
(2) The Baldwin piano with delivery to occur after the last child 
reaches majority or has moved from the home, whichever occurs first. 
Petitioner shall have the responsibility of maintaining the piano and 
having it tuned annually. 
(3). One-half of the power and hand tools. The tools are to be divided 
under an arrangement that petitioner is to make a List "A" and a List 
"B", dividing the tools. Respondent will then have the choice of which 
list of tools he desires and will be awarded those tools. Petitioner will 
be awarded the rest. 
15 
^*3 
6. With regard to the indebtedness of the parties, petitioner should assume and 
pay the first mortgage obligation on the house and real property at 1995 South Maple 
Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah. Respondent is ordered to assume and pay all other liabilities 
and debt incurred during this marriage, including but not limited to any liabilities in 
connection with DSI, the Bear Hollow property and Omega Oil. 
7. The Court finds that petitioner is entitled to be and is awarded the custody 
of the minor children of the parties, subject to respondent's reasonable rights of visitation, 
which right of visitation shall be, at a minimum, consistent with the schedule provided under 
the Minimum Visitation Guidelines set forth in Title 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated. The 
respondent shall have the right to visit with the children irrespective of the payment of child 
support. During visitation, there shall be no phone calls to the children unless there is an 
emergency. Visitation should be specifically scheduled on a monthly basis one month in 
advance and if respondent is scheduled to have the children for a visitation, he must give 
the petitioner at least 24 hours' notice of his intent not to exercise the scheduled visitation. 
Respondent should have such other extended visitation as agreeable 
to the parties mutually. 
8. The Court finds that respondent's obligation to petitioner for child support, 
taking into consideration the amount of alimony awarded, shall be the sum of $2,000 a 
month and this award of child support shall commence with the month of December, 1998. 
So long as respondent is current on his obligation for child support, he can claim one of the 
children as a deduction'for income tax purposes, which right to declare one of the children 
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as a deduction for income tax purposes shall not arise until he has used his net loss carry 
forward as reflected on his income tax returns. 
9. As a further obligation of child support, respondent shall pay health and 
accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children and shall be responsible for two-
thirds of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia and counseling expenses for the minor 
children of the parties. 
10. Based upon the financial circumstances of the parties the Court finds that 
petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses, exclusive of fiability for income taxes is the sum 
of $5,000 a month. Respondent has detailed expenses of $10,500 a month, a substantial 
portion of which relates to the Bear Hollow home, which is currently listed for sale and 
which it is anticipated will be sold in the near future, 
11. Based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties the Court finds 
that respondent shall pay to petitioner alimony in the sum of $3,000 a month and petitioner 
is awarded alimony in this amount commencing with the month of December, 1998. 
Petitioner's entitlement to alimony, based upon the marriage of the parties from 1980 to 
1996, should be for the period of 16 years or until such time as petitioner remarries, 
cohabits or the death of either party. Alimony under this judgment should commence with 
the month of December, 1998. 
12. The Court further finds that the alimony and child support in the combined 
amount of $5,000 is an amount which petitioner should receive from respondent retroactive 
to the date of the first Order entered by Commissioner Dillon in this action. Respondent 
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shall receive credit for any payments which he has made against this obligation, which 
payments will be applied pro rata to child support and alimony with 2/5 to be applied to 
child support and 3/5 to be applied to alimony. The Court finds that from the entry of the 
Temporary Order through the month of February, 1999, based on this calculation and 
reflecting credits for payments, there are arrearages which shall be reduced to judgment 
in the amount of $93,586.00. These arrearages do not give credit to respondent for a 
claimed payment on the first mortgage on petitioner's home in December, 1996, in the 
amount of $6,902.25. If respondent can document this payment, then it would constitute 
a reduction against the above balance. 
The Court finds that the arrearages reflected above are for alimony 
and child support with $37,434.40 as arrearages in child support and $56,151.60 as 
arrearages in alimony. 
13. As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by Louise Knauer, the 
Court awards attorneys' fees to petitioner in the form of a judgment for the services of 
Louise Knauer in the amount of $10,951. 
14. As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by B. L. Dart and Mark 
A. Larsen, the Court awards petitioner a judgment for the amount of $25,000 attorneys' 
fees. 
15. The award of attorneys' fees shall be reduced to judgment with the judgment 
for the past-due support. 
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16. Petitioner is further awarded her costs incurred in this action in the sum of 
$2,890.76 as reflected on Exhibit Nos. 15 & 16. 
17. The judgments entered in this action for arrearages of child support and 
alimony and for attorneys' fees should be filed in the State of Alaska to attach respondent's 
interest in the Kodiak property and in Summit County, Utah, to attach respondent's interest 
in the Bear Hollow property. 
Dated this ^flfedav of *LJIJ 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Rodney gj^age, District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
$li^Y^ • 
ELLEN MAYO^K 
Attorney for Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the _/ day of July, 1999,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing 
to: 
Ellen Maycock 
Attorney for Respondent 
50 West Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
David Benard, Esq. 
523 Heritage Blvd., #1 
Layton, UT 84041 
WLwu»-f{ liXimkJl 
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HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
Facsimile: (801)539-5210 
SECOND 
JDISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY (DIVISION I) 
STATE OF UTAH 
SONIA KELLEY, 
VS. 
WAYNE KELLEY, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON REMAND FROM THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Civil No. 944700827 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
This case is before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals, Kelley v. 
Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 (Utah CI App /!000l wherwn the Court nt Appeals affirmed this 
Court's decision is certain respects and reversed on others. On remand, the only 
remaining issues are .(1) the proper allocation of the properties acquired by the parties 
during the term of their common law marriage; and (2) whether "extenuating 
circumstances" justify an award of alimony to the Petitioner for a period of time longer 
than the five year term of the common law marriage. These issues were tried before 
the Court ori August 16, 2001, with James C. Haskins, of Haskins & Associates, P.C, 
&~ 
representing the Plaintiff Sonia Kelley and Martin W. Custen representing the 
Respondent, Wayne Kelley. The Court, having considered the evidence submitted at 
the trial of this case as well as the evidence submitted at trial on remand, together with 
the post-trial memoranda of the parties, and having entered its Memorandum Decision 
on April 10, 2002, being fully advised in the premises, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 52 
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were initially married on May 24,1980, and two children 
were born as issue of that marriage. The parties were divorced for the first time 
pursuant to a stipulated decree of divorce entered on July 18,1994. 
2. The original decree of divorce awarded to the petitioner the home of the 
parties, subject to the indebtedness thereon; the furniture and fixtures; and two vehicles 
in her possession. The respondent was awarded any other interest the parties had in 
real estate, including the Alaska property, subject to the indebtedness thereon. The 
respondent was also awarded the vehicle in his possession, certain furniture and 
fixtures, and his stock in DSI International, Inc. ("DSI") together with any interest the 
parties had in that company. 
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3. The original decree awarded the petitioner $1,000.00 per month child 
support, and $1,000.00 per month alimony. The alimony was to be terminated in three 
years, upon remarriage of the petitioner, or by operation of law, whichever occurred 
first. 
4. Following the original decree of divorce, the parties immediately entered 
into a common law marital relationship. They continued to act just as they had before 
the decree was entered. The children were not told of the divorce. The parties filed 
joint income tax returns in 1994, and continued to hold themselves out as a married 
•couple. The. respondent continued to* provide the petitioner with approximately 
$7,500.00 per month to meet family expenses, just as he had done prior to the decree 
being entered. None of the titles to "the property awarded in the decree were ever 
changed until the parties began having difficulty in 1996. 
5. During the course of the common law marriage, the petitioner acquii ed 
no additional property. The real property awarded to the petitioner in the original 
divorce decree was thereafter her separate property However, during the period ol the 
common law marriage, petitioner's home appreciated in value, and the principal due on 
the home was reduced by payments on the mortgage made from monies of the marital 
estate. During the trial on remand, however, the parties stipulated that the respondent 
would waive any claim to that increase in equity in pxchdimqe toi f i r ppfilinmi s \m\nhj 
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the attorney fees owing to Ms. Louise Knauer that the respondent was previously 
ordered to pay, and the Court approved that stipulation. 
6. While the evidence at the original trial suggested that the DSI stock had 
some value, it was impossible to ascertain that value because of DSI's substantial debt 
structure, and with DSPs purchase of the Mathews Company, its liabilities far exceeded 
its receivables. The settling of the F & D lawsuit, which provided some $1.3 million in 
settlement to DSI, did not substantially change that, inasmuch as DSI invested that 
money in a new venture to develop high-end residential property. Thus, significant debt 
over and above the settlement amount still existed. The only real value that DSI has is 
its good will value, which value is best reflected in the fact that the Elga Company was 
willing to loan $25,000 to the respondent using the respondents remaining stock in DSI 
as collateral, to enable the respondent to gain release of his passport from the Office of 
Recovery Services, State of Utah. When the respondent defaulted on the loan, the 
stock was defaulted to Elga. The Court finds that the value of DSI's good will at the 
time of the original decree of divorce in 1994 was $25,000.00, which is essentially the 
same value that the good will would have had in 1998, when the stock was defaulted. 
7. In July, 1996, the respondent purchased, in his own name, certain 
property in Park City, Utah, known as the Bear Hollow property. The property was titled 
in respondent's name alone. The respondent obtained a loan of $250,000.00 in his 
name on the Bear Hollow property from Olympus Holdings, Ltd., in 1997. He used the 
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$250,000.00 to begin construction on the Bear Hollow property and to pay various other 
personal expenses. 
8. Olympus Holdings, Ltd. ("Olympus"), was a Washington corporation 
created for the purpose of facilitating a loan to the respondent. The money for the loan 
came from a Mr. Charles Walch and certain unnamed investors in Switzerland. It was a 
high-interest loan carrying approximately 18 percent interest. The respondent, along 
with Mr. Fred Frink, facilitated the organization of Olympus, and both acted as officers 
and directors. Elaine Gerber, a friend of the respondent, also served as an agent for 
Olympus. 
9. Subsequently, the respondent obtained a construction mortgage on the 
Bear Hollow property from On Line Lending in the amount of $500,000.00 in his own 
name. The Olympus loan was subordinated to the On Line loan, so that the On Line 
loan took first position on the Bear Hollow property. 
10. After this time, DSI also invested large sums in the development of the 
Bear Hollow property. DSI filed a lien against the Bear Hollow property and 
subsequently brought an action against the parties herein, Olympus, and others, 
seeking to determine the priority of the numerous claims on the property, DSI 
International, Ind. v. Wayne Kelley, et a/., Civil No. 980700264 (3rd Dist Ct Utah, 
Summit County), and that case remains pending. 
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11. In the Spring, 1999, the Bear Hollow property was sold. From the 
proceeds of sale, the loan to On Line Lending was paid off, and also a check was 
issued to Olympus to pay off its mortgage on the property. That check was issued to 
Elaine Gerber, a friend of the respondent, in the amount of $361,146.00 in April, 1999, 
and sent to her address in Texas, where she was residing with the respondent. She, in 
turn/endorsed the check over to Walch Investments, the company of Mr. Charles 
Walch, who provided some of the money for the initial loan from Olympus on the Bear 
Hollow property. 
12. No portion of the $361,146.00, referred to in paragraph 11, above, was 
property of the respondent, and thus no portion of that amount was a marital asset. 
13. Certain funds from the proceeds of sale of the Bear Hollow property 
remain in escrow and are held by the Court in that proceeding pending a determination 
of the interests of DSI and the other parties to that litigation in the Bear Hollow property. 
14. Whatever interest the petitioner or the respondent may have in the 
proceeds from the sale of the Bear Hollow property is a marital asset of the parties 
herein. 
15. During the course of the common law marriage, respondent purchased 
certain furniture and fixtures for the Bear Hollow property from marital assets. 
16. The furniture purchased by the respondent during the course of the 
common law marriage consisted of the following: 
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Item 
Girls canopy bed 
Girls matching chest 
Girls matching night stand 
Girls matching desk & vanity 
Twin bed 
Twin bed 
Twin bed 
Twin bed 
Twin bed 
King bed 
King bed 
Sofa 
Sofa 
Love Seat 
Easy Chair 
Easy Chair 
Antique Table 
Dining Table 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Chest of Drawers 
Purchase 
Price 
$ 900.00 
$ 800.00 
$ 350.00 
$ 600.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 200.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$3,500.00 
$1,200.00 
$1,000.00 
$ 750.00 
$ 750.00 
$5,000.00 
$7,500.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
Disposition 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful, 
Lost in move 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Sold with 2325 Bear Hollow 
Sold with 2325 Bear Hollow 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Respondent retained 
Damaged beyond repair 
UT 
UT 
UT 
UT 
UT 
17. In September, 1995, as a result of his work on the F & D lawsuit for 
DSI, the Board of Directors of DSI gave the respondent a bonus in the range of 
$120,000.00. The respondent elected to take the bonus in the form of a new Mercedes-
Benz 600 SL. The respondent ordered the vehicle for delivery in Europe. 
18. In September, 1996, the respondent went to Germany to pick up the 
vehicle, which was paid for by DSI. The purchase order was made out in respondent's 
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name alone. He brought the car back to the United States and drove it for a period of 
time. In the Summer, 1998, the respondent sold the vehicle to Mr. Fred Frink, a 
business associate, for $95,000.00. The vehicle was titled in the respondent's name in 
Alaska at the time of the sale to Mr. Frink. The respondent signed a bill of sale in his 
own name on the vehicle to Mr. Frink. Mr. Frink paid the respondent $50,000.00 in 
cash, and signed a promissory note dated June 1, 1998, in favor of the respondent 
personally, for $45,000.00. At no time did any paperwork in conjunction with the 
vehicle ever indicate that it belonged to anyone other than the respondent. 
19. The testimony of the respondent with respect to the Mercedes-Benz 
600 SL was not credible. The value of the vehicle, representing a bonus paid to the 
respondent during the course of the common law marriage, was $95,000.00. 
20. In 1996, Ms. Teresa Turner purchased an E-Class Mercedes-Benz 
automobile. The Respondent arranged for the purchase of the vehicle and provided a 
certified check to the dealer for the purchase price of approximately $30,000.00. Of that 
amount, $20,000.00 was provided by Ms. Turner as part of an inheritance she received 
from her aunt. The balance of $10,000.00 was provided by the respondent, but was a 
repayment by the respondent of a loan made to him in the amount of $10,000.00 by Ms. 
Turner at the time she sold her prior vehicle. 
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21. In 1998, the respondent arranged for the purchase of a 1998 
Oldsmobile for Ms. Elaine Gerber, to be picked up in Illinois in her name and with her 
money. 
22. In 1998, the respondent purchased an engagement ring for Ms. Gerber 
for approximately $24,000.00. He paid twenty percent down and agreed to pay the 
balance in one year, with interest. The balance owing on the ring after payment of the 
down payment approximated the value of the ring. 
23. Any interest which the respondent owns in Omega Oil is speculative, at 
best. 
24. The parties herein had been married for a total of fourteen years when 
the original decree of divorce was entered in July, 1994. As part of the original decree, 
the parties stipulated to child support in the amount of $1,000.00 per month, and 
alimony of $1,000.00 per month. The alimony was to terminate in three years, upon the 
petitioners' death or remarriage, or by operation of law, whichever first occurred. At the 
time of the original decree, the petitioner had not worked outside the home since the 
time of her marriage in 1980. She had no income. Her expenses during the course of 
the common law marriage far exceeded the $2,000.00 per month provided in the 
decree. Her house payment alone, without considering any other expenses, was 
$2,400.00 per month. The respondent had been providing her approximately $7,500.00 
per month to meet family expenses. 
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25. The provisions of the 1994 decree were clearly inadequate as 
evidenced by the parties continued actions. They continued to reside together in a 
common law relationship just as though no decree had ever been entered. The 
respondent continued to provide support to petitioner and the children in the amount in 
excess of $7,000.00 per month, just as he had before. The petitioner and the children 
continued in the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. It was not until after 
the parties began having difficulty in 1996 that things changed. 
26. Subsequently, the Commissioner established temporary support and 
alimony of $6,000.00 per month. At trial, based upon the petitioner's gross income of 
$1,486.00 per month, and respondent's historical income of $10,000.00 per month, and 
in light of the expenses of the parties, the Court set child support at $2,000.00 per 
month and alimony at $3,000.00 per month. 
27. The parties have been married continually, in either a solemnized 
marriage or a common law marriage, from 1980 through July of 1999, more than 
eighteen years. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-16.1 (1969). 
2. Any allocation of the parties property acquired during the term of the 
common law marriage requires a systematic approach wherein the Court categorizes 
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that property as part of the marital estate or as separate property belonging to one or 
the other of the parties. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
3. Each party is presumed to be entitled to his or her own separate property 
and fifty percent of the marital property, absent exceptional circumstances justifying a 
different result. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
4. The DSI stock was the separate property of the respondent and, in any 
event, the value of that stock did not increase during the term of the common law 
marriage. There are no exceptional circumstances justifying any departure from the 
presumption that the value of the DSI stock, as the respondent's separate property, 
should be awarded to the respondent. 
5. The property known as the Bear Hollow property was purchased by the 
respondent during the term of the common law marriage and, to whatever extent either 
party herein owned any interest in the Bear Hollow property (which is presently in 
dispute in the Summit County litigation), the proceeds of sale are a marital asset. There 
are no exceptional circumstances justifying any departure from the presumption that the 
proceeds of the sale of the Bear Hollow property, to whatever extent either party owned 
an interest therein, as a marital asset, should be awarded equally to the parties herein. 
6. No portion of the funds used by Elaine Gerber to pay off the Olympus 
loan was the property of the respondent, and those funds were neither a marital asset 
nor his own separate property, but belonged to a third party. 
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7. The antique table and dining room table identified in Finding of Fact No. 
16 above, were fixtures sold with the Bear Hollow property, and the value of those 
assets is reflected in the sales price of that property. Thus, the parties' interest in those 
assets will be determined by the outcome of the litigation presently pending in Summit 
County, Utah. Whatever interest, if any, the parties may have in the proceeds of the 
sale of the Bear Hollow property should be awarded equally to the parties as set forth in 
Conclusion o f Law No. 4, above. 
8. The other items identified in Finding of Fact No. 16 above, with the 
exception of the first four items listed, are marital assets which normally would be 
distributed equally between the parties. However, exceptional circumstances justify an 
award of these items to the respondent, in light of his obligation to pay the marital debts 
incurred during the course of the common law marriage. As to the first four items listed, 
these were gifts to the respondent's daughter, and those items belong to her and are 
neither marital assets nor the separate assets of either of the parties herein. 
9. As to the Mercedes-Benz 600 SL, the value of that vehicle was a bonus 
paid to the respondent during the course of the common law marriage, and thus the 
value of that vehicle is a marital asset. No exceptional circumstances justify any 
departure from the presumption that, as a marital asset, the value of that asset should 
be divided equally between the parties. 
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10. As to the E-Class Mercedes Benz purchased by Teresa Turner, while 
$10,000.00 of the purchase price was provided by the respondent, those funds 
represent the repayment of a loan to Ms. Turner which is not a marital asset, but 
represent the respondents separate property. No exceptional circumstances justify any 
departure from the presumption that, as his separate property, those funds should be 
awarded to the respondent. 
11. As to the engagement ring purchased by the respondent for Ms. Elaine 
Gerber, the Court finds that the balance due on the ring, with interest, would 
approximate the value of the ring, and thus the ring has no value as a marital asset. 
12. As to the respondent's interest in Omega Oil, the Court finds that any 
such interest is speculative, at best, but is in any event the separate property of the 
respondent. No exceptional circumstances justify any departure from the presumption 
that, as his separate property, his interest in Omega Oil, whatever it may be, should be 
awarded to the respondent. 
13. Based upon (1) the long duration of the parties' marriage; (2) the 
standard of living to which the petitioner and the parties1 children have become 
accustomed (which was encouraged by the respondent); (3) the needs of the petitioner 
and her inability to make more than $1,486.00 per month; and (4) the respondent's 
ability to make substantially more than the petitioner, the Court finds these extenuating 
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circumstances to justify the Court in extending alimony beyond the term of the common 
law marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1999). 
DATED this J a ^ L day of May, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY a) PAGE V
s
-
Second Judicial District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/ u v t S Uj. Q/^j/ 
Martin W. Custen 
Attorney for Respondent 
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